Abstract. A new asymmetric cryptosystem based on the Integer Factorization Problem is proposed. It posses an encryption and decryption speed of O(n 2 ), thus making it the fastest asymmetric encryption scheme available. It has a simple mathematical structure. Thus, it would have low computational requirements and would enable communication devices with low computing power to deploy secure communication procedures efficiently.
Introduction
By textbook convention the discrete log problem (DLP) and the elliptic curve discrete log problem (ECDLP) has been the source of security for cryptographic schemes such as the Diffie Hellman key exchange (DHKE) procedure, El-Gamal cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) respectively [2] , [8] . As for the world renowned RSA cryptosystem, the inability to find the e-th root of the ciphertext C modulo N from the congruence relation C ≡ M e (mod N ) coupled with the inability to factor N = pq for large primes p and q is its fundamental source of security [11] . It has been suggested that the ECC is able to produce the same level of security as the RSA with shorter key length. Thus, ECC should be the preferred asymmetric cryptosystem when compared to RSA [16] . Hence, the notion "cryptographic efficiency" is conjured. That is, to produce an asymmetric cryptographic scheme that could produce security equivalent to a certain key length of the traditional RSA but utilizing shorter keys. However, in certain situations where a large block needs to be encrypted, RSA is the better option than ECC because ECC would need more computational effort to undergo such a task [13] . Thus, adding another characteristic toward the notion of "cryptographic efficiency" which is it must be less "computational intensive" and be able to transmit large blocks of data (when needed). In 1998 the cryptographic scheme known as NTRU was proposed with better "cryptographic efficiency" relative to RSA and ECC [5] [6] [7] . NTRU has a complexity order of O(n 2 ) for both encryption and decryption as compared to DHKE, EL-Gammal, RSA and ECC (all have a complexity order of O(n 3 )). As such, in order to design a state-of-the-art public key mechanism, the following are characteristics that must be "ideally" achieved (apart from other well known security issues):
(1) Shorter key length. If possible shorter than ECC 160-bits. In this paper, we produce a newly designed asymmetric cryptosystem based on the Integer Factorization Problem. The scheme does not require "expensive" operations. It only requires multiplication and addition for encryption and for decryption it only utilizes multiplication together with a one time modular reduction.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we define the Diophantine Equation Hard Problem (DEHP) which is the source of "mathematical hardness" integrated within the ciphertext equation. The new asymmetric cryptosystem will be detailed in Section 3. In Section 4, the authors detail the decryption process and provide a proof of correctness. An example will also be presented. Continuing in Section 5, we will discuss algebraic attacks. An analysis of lattice based attack will be given in Section 6. Section 7 will be about the underlying security principles of the AA β scheme. A table of comparison between the AA β scheme against RSA,ECC and NTRU is given in Section 8. Finally, we shall conclude in Section 9.
The Diophantine Equation Hard Problem (DEHP)
In this section we begin by producing a diophantine equation of the form C = Ax + By where (A, B, C) are known integers while (x, y) are unknown integers. Another condition is that gcd(A, B) = 1. We will observe the following 2 cases: 2.1. Case 1. Let the public parameters (A, B) be of length n-bits and the secret parameters (x, y) also be of length n-bits.
The general solution for (x, y) is given by
Since the size if the unknown parameters (x, y) are n-bits, from the following inequality
B and by the fact that 2 n−1 < B < 2 n − 1, the interval that the variable t belongs to is approximately given by 2
As a result an attacker could be able to determine the value of t and solve for the unknown pair (x, y) in polynomial time.
2.2. Case 2. Let the public parameters (A, B) be of length n-bits and the secret parameters (x, y) be of length 2n-bits. The general solution for (x, y) is given by
Since the size if the unknown parameters (x, y) are 2n-bits, from the following inequality 2 2n−1 − x 0 B < t < 2 2n − 1 − x 0 B and by the fact that 2 n−1 < B < 2 n − 1, the interval that the variable t belongs to is approximately given by 2
As a result an attacker could not be able to determine the value of t and solve for the unknown pair (x, y) in polynomial time for sufficiently large n.
Definition (DEHP). The Diophantine Equation Hard
Problem (DEHP) is the problem to determine the preferred solution set (x, y) from C = Ax + By where (A, B, C) in known and (x, y) is unknown. A correct implementation of DEHP will be executed as describe in Case 2 above. If the preferred solution set is obtained then the equation C is said to be prf -solved.
A new asymmetric algorithm based on Integer Factorization Problem
Let us begin by stating that the communication process is between A (Along) and B (Busu), where Busu is sending information to Along after encrypting the plaintext with Along's public key.
• Key Generation by Along INPUT: Generate a pair of random n-bit prime numbers p and q, an n-bit odd integer k 1 , k 2 = q−k1 2 and a random 2n-bit integer u. Another condition is that p > 2 n−1 + 2 n−2 . OUTPUT: The public key e 1 and e 2 where
• e 2 = u − pk 2 and the private key pair (p, d) where d ≡ v −1 (mod p) and v ≡ u(mod p).
• Encryption by Busu
The public key (e 1 , e 2 ) and the message M where M is an n-bit integer within the interval (2 n−1 , 2 n − 1) and M < 2 n−1 + 2 n−2 . As a result M < p. Compute a random 3n-bit integer X and compute Y = X − M .
OUTPUT: The ciphertext C = Xe 1 − Y e 2 .
• Decryption by Along We now proceed to give a proof of correctness.
Observe that, modular reduction does not occur since M < p.
4.1.
Example. Let n = 16. Along will choose the primes p = 65287 and q = 40829. Then Along chooses the following private parameters:
The public keys will be
Busu's message will be M = 43963 with the following accompanying parameters
The ciphertext will be C = 750300520815394662808057. To decrypt is arbitrary.
Algebraic Attacks

5.1.
Computing with X. To find X = X 0 + e 2 j, we should find an integer j such that 2 3n−1 < X < 2 3n − 1. This gives
We know that 2 2n−1 < e 2 < 2 2n − 1. Then the difference between the upper and the lower bound is
Hence the difference is very large and finding the correct j is infeasible.
Remark 5.1. If one attempts to compute with Y the above scenario when computing with X would appear.
5.2.
Euclidean division attack. From C = Xe 1 − Y e 2 , the size of each public parameter within C ensures that Euclidean division attacks does not occur. This can be easily deduced as follows:
Analysis on lattice based attack
With reference to the AA β scheme in [1] which has gone through square lattice attack, the ciphertext equation in this article is of the same structure. Recall that the the structure of the ciphertext AA β scheme is as follows:
where both (U, V 2 ) are of size 4n-bits, while both (e A1 , e A2 ) are of size 3n-bits. That is, the unknown parameters are larger by n-bits from the known parameters. It is by this fact that the square lattice attack as described in [1] failed upon the AA β scheme. Now, observe that the ciphertext in this article also has its unknown parameters to be larger by n-bits than the known parameters. It is arbitrary to replicate the empirical evidence by executing the LLL algorithm upon the scheme in this article to see that the square lattice attack will not succeed.
7.
Underlying security principles 7.1. The public key Integer Factorization Problem. Observe that one can obtain e 1 − e 2 = pq. This is obviously the Integer Factorization Problem. 
Table of Comparison
The following is a table of comparison between RSA, ECC, NTRU and the scheme in this article. Let |E| denote public key size.
Algorithm
Encryption 
Conclusion
The asymmetric scheme presented in this paper provides a secure avenue for implementors who need encryption and decryption speed of complexity order O(n 2 ).
